

times evoke the same recollections. and if the recollections differ the impulses which are released will also be different. The feelings with which we meet an acquaintance will depend upon the recollections that spring up of previous meetings.

Thirdly there is the difference which will result from our exerting or not exerting our power of will—of deliberately choosing or deliberately rejecting. There are, then, an indefinite number of possibilities in a man's behaviour under any stimulus, and human nature is accordingly very uncertain and very inconsistent.

Are we then, it may be asked, as fallen leaves, set in a whirl by conflicting gusts of passion, and finally driven this way or that by the strongest of them? So, in a measure, may be represented the ever-running drama of man's temptation. But the impulses which we have been attempting to catalogue do not possess the stage to themselves: they are joined, in particular, by three others—

reason, will, and habit—which are of a different character, which act as prompters to the company and may give to one of them the accession of energy that enables it to lead. Reason may be improved by education: will may be invigorated by practice. And by the acquisition of habits through his will power and his imitative faculty man may so facilitate the outwellings of some impulses at the expense of others as apparently to transform the character with which he was born.

By yielding to an impulse we, so to
speak, widen
the outlet for it, and proportionately
lessen the
stream of impulses which compete with
it. By
working steadily we may enhance the
influence of
the industrial impulse, as by
indulging our
appetites we strengthen their hold
over us. By
habit, then, as well as by will, a man
may bring
unruly impulses under discipline. Yet
his for-